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COATS V. DISH: A CHANCE TO CLEAR THE LEGAL HAZE 




SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION  
This article examines the history of medical marijuana in Colorado, 
the current state of the law, and the case of Coats v. Dish Network, 
L.L.C.1—a case that marks the first time the Colorado Supreme Court 
will weigh in on medical marijuana.  
On November 7, 2000, Colorado voters, by a margin of 54% for and 
46% against, voted to legalize medical marijuana.
2
 This represented a 
little over 900,000 votes in favor.
3
 That vote was the beginning of a 
grand experiment that was guaranteed to be interesting because the state 
law did not fit comfortably into the federal scheme of drug regulation. 
Marijuana was, and is, listed as a Schedule I drug under federal law.
4
 
This created uncertainties as to how the federal government would inter-
act with the state.  
Today, the friction between state and federal law continues to be 
addressed by Colorado courts. But, surprisingly, the friction is not where 
some expected. Initially, many worried that the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration might raid medical marijuana dispensaries or that business-
es, caregivers, or patients involved with medical marijuana might be 
prosecuted. By and large, these things did not come to pass.  
Instead, the federal government has largely left Colorado alone. In 
fact, it has issued two different memorandums addressing Colorado’s law 
that suggest it would be a waste of federal resources to interfere in what 
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 1. 303 P.3d 147, 149 (Colo. App. 2013), cert. granted, 2014 WL 279960 (Colo. Jan. 27, 
2014). 
 2. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE BY STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO 
REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST 8, 20 (2013), http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/State-by-
State-Laws-Report-2013.pdf. 
 3. Colorado Medical Use of Marijuana, Initiative 20 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Marijuana_Act,_Amendment_20_(2000). 
 4. Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 5. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Selected U.S. Attorneys 
(Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192. It is likely not an efficient 
use of federal resources to focus enforcement efforts on “individuals with cancer or other serious 
illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable 
state law,” or their caregivers. Indeed, in its most recent memorandum, the federal government has 
gone so far as to suggest that state legalization might fit within the federal approach to drug regula-
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As a result, the continued tension over medical marijuana and the 
Medical Marijuana Amendment (MMA) is playing out largely in the 
civil setting. The questions pop up in strange places. Can an employer 
terminate an employee who tests positive for THC but is performing his 
work satisfactorily and is taking medical marijuana pursuant to the 
MMA? Is renting space to medical marijuana growers the functional 
equivalent, at least in a bankruptcy proceeding, of running a crack 
house? Can unemployment benefits be denied if someone is terminated 
for using medical marijuana?  
And one can imagine many more questions. Does a person endanger 
his Social Security disability benefits if he uses medical marijuana to 
treat his disability? Can an insurer refuse to pay claims when medical 
marijuana crops are damaged by negligence? May a party sue for breach 
of contract if someone refuses to deliver medical marijuana? Is a bank 
liable for doing business with enterprises that grow or sell marijuana?  
Some of these questions have been answered, or at least addressed, 
but many have not. The result is that over a decade since the MMA be-
came effective, significant issues still need to be resolved. As discussed 
in this article, the current law is probably best described as muddled. 
Several courts have referred to medical marijuana as “lawful.” Some 
courts, including some of those same courts concluded, however, that 
medical marijuana was not really legal. Others suggest there might be a 
constitutional right to medical marijuana, while two dissents explicitly 
reach this conclusion. Although many years have passed, the Colorado 
Supreme Court has not addressed any of these questions. But that will 
soon change. In January 2014, it granted certiorari on its first medical 
marijuana case—a case styled Coats v. DISH Network, L.L.C.6  
In Coats, a paralyzed man who uses medical marijuana to control 
painful muscle spasms was fired for testing positive for THC. He argues 
that his behavior is lawful under the MMA and is therefore protected 
under the Lawful Activity Statute (LAS)—a statute that prohibits em-
ployers from terminating workers for lawful behavior outside the work 
place. DISH asserts that the termination is justified because medical ma-
rijuana is not lawful.  
  
tion. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. See 
also James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Address before the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary (Sept. 10, 2013) (“Indeed, a robust system may affirmatively address those federal priorities by, 
for example, implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of marijuana outside of the 
regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an 
illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly regulated market in which reve-
nues are tracked and accounted for.”), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-130910.html. 
 6. 2014 WL 279960 (Colo. Jan. 27, 2014). 
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The Colorado Supreme Court's resolution of the case likely won’t 
answer all the questions that exist around medical marijuana, but it could 
be a good start. Based on the issues the court accepted for review, the 
decision could clarify two important questions. The issues accepted for 
review are:  
1. Whether the Lawful Activities Statute, section 24–34–402.5,
7
 pro-
tects employees from discretionary discharge for lawful use of medi-




2. Whether the [MMA] makes the use of medical marijuana “lawful” 
and confers a right to use medical marijuana to persons lawfully reg-
istered with the state.
9
 
The first issue arises directly from the case below. But the second, 
larger question of whether the MMA makes medical marijuana lawful 
and whether it grants a right to use it, was not addressed by the majority 
in Coats and was only briefly discussed by the minority. This issue is 
arguably central to Coats, but it also has the potential to impact the anal-
ysis in a variety of other cases.  
For example, if possession and distribution of medical marijuana is 
lawful, then perhaps it is insurable. Perhaps it can be the subject of con-
tract action. Perhaps it can be reported stolen. On the other hand, if the 
Colorado Supreme Court were to determine that medical marijuana is not 
fully lawful, even under state law, it may require a more careful evalua-
tion of the state’s regulation of a potentially illegal activity. It would also 
certainly implicate the ability of people like Mr. Coats to use medical 
marijuana, while also calling into question the security of the investment 
of anyone engaged in the business of medical marijuana.  
The remainder of this article provides a basic review of the MMA, 
examines the statutes that implement it, provides an overview of existing 
case law, reviews the facts and law in Coats to date, and briefly discusses 
how Coats could be decided in a way that promotes sound policy and is 
consistent with existing law.  
SECTION 2. THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA AMENDMENT  
The MMA provides a relatively complete guide to how medical ma-
rijuana should operate in Colorado. But fourteen years later, central ques-
tions about its meaning remain. Courts continue to wrestle with whether 
the statute makes the use of medical marijuana lawful or whether it simp-
ly creates an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution. Of course, this 
  
 7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2007). 
 8. Coats, 2014 WL 279960. 
 9. Id.  
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is a distinction only lawyers can dream up. To most people, to say that 
one cannot be prosecuted for using medical marijuana, within certain 
limits, is to say that it is legal. Closely connected—and perhaps contem-
poraneous with this debate—is the debate about whether the MMA cre-
ates a state constitutional right to use medical marijuana within pre-
scribed limits. I begin by briefly reviewing the MMA and the statutes 
that were passed to implement it.  
SECTION 2.1. The Text of the MMA 
The MMA is the 14
th
 Amendment to the Colorado Constitution. Its 
central provisions are summarized in the table below, along with a few 
quotes from its text. The quotes focus largely on sections that might ad-
dress the lawful question.
10
 
Section 2(a) Affirmative defense to criminal prosecution. 
SELECTED TEXT: “[A] patient or primary care-giver charged with a viola-
tion of the state's criminal laws related to the patient's medical use of marijuana 
will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense to such allegation 
[when the patient has a debilitating medical condition, a doctor recommends 
medical marijuana, and the amounts are as allowed in another section].” 
Section 3 Requires confidential registration and provides guidelines and penalties.  
Section 4(a)  Makes use lawful and identifies amounts allowable.  
SELECTED TEXT: “A patient's medical use of marijuana, within the follow-
ing limits, is lawful . . . .”  
Section 5(a) Prohibits use that would harm public and prohibits use in public; if violated, loss of 
registration card for one year.  
NOTE: This is not a criminal penalty. It could be read as a loss of the right to 
use medical marijuana.  
Section 6  Prescribes a minimum age for medical marijuana and exceptions. 
  
 10. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14. 
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Section 9 Requires production of a form for registration. 
Section 10  Exempts medical insurers from covering medical marijuana. 
 
SECTION 2.2. The Colorado Medical Marijuana Code  
The MMA is complemented by statutes designed to implement it.
11
 
They are collectively known as the “Colorado Medical Marijuana Code” 
and span hundreds of pages.
12
 However, the “Legislative Declaration” 
section is pertinent in answering the question of whether medical mariju-
ana is lawful. That section states: 
The general assembly further declares that it is unlawful under state 
law to cultivate, manufacture, distribute, or sell medical marijuana, 
except in compliance with the terms, conditions, limitations, and re-
strictions in section 14 of article XVIII of the state constitution and 
this article or when acting as a primary caregiver in compliance with 




As evidenced above, the MMA and the Colorado Medical Marijua-
na Code establish at least some circumstances in which medical marijua-
na is lawful. The section that follows reviews some of the leading cases 
and other sources of legal guidance as to how these sections are actually 
being interpreted.  
SECTION 3. LEGAL GUIDANCE TO DATE 
A number of cases provide some guidance regarding the MMA, or 
the interface between state and federal law. Similarly, a formal opinion 
by the Colorado Attorney General also provides guidance. A variety of 
these sources use words like lawful, authorize, legal, and some either 
overtly state (in dissents) or suggest that the MMA might create a consti-
tutional right. Each source is summarized below, providing some empha-
sis on the sections that might inform the court’s decision in Coats regard-
ing the import of the MMA.  
SECTION 3.1. Attorney General – Formal Opinion No. 09-06 – Novem-
ber 16, 2009 
In 2009, Governor Bill Ritter, Jr. requested an opinion from the At-
torney General’s office regarding the applicability of state sales tax to the 
purchase and sale of medical marijuana.
14
 The request was framed as six 
  
 11. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-43.3-100–1102 (2010). 
 12. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-43.3-101 (West 2010). 
 13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.3-102(2) (2010). 
 14. Formal Opinion No. 09-06, Op. Att’y Gen. 2009 WL 6084227 (Colo. A.G. Nov. 16, 
2009). 
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questions from the Governor’s Chief Legal Counsel.
15
 Most interesting 
among the questions were questions one and five and their corresponding 
answers.  
Question 1. Is medical marijuana “tangible personal property” sub-
ject to the state sales tax under the Colorado tax code, section 39-26-
104(1)(a), C.R.S.? 
Answer 1. Yes. Medical marijuana is tangible personal property and 




Question 5. Regardless of the legality of the activity, are individuals 
and enterprises that engage in the sale of medical marijuana pursuant 
to Amendment 20 required to obtain a license and otherwise comply 
with the requirements of section 39-26-103, C.R.S.? 
Answer 5. Yes. Unless subject to a particular exemption, it is unlaw-
ful under section 39-26-103(1)(a), C.R.S., for any individual or en-
terprise to engage in the business of selling at retail without first hav-




The opinion also provided explanations for each answer. The expla-
nation for the answer to Question 1—addressing whether medical mari-
juana is tangible personal property—is relatively straightforward. It con-
cludes that Colorado’s definition of “‘tangible personal property’ em-
braces all goods, wares, merchandise, products and commodities.”
18
 
The answer to Question 5—asking whether, regardless of legality, 
medical marijuana sales and purchases are subject to sales taxes—is a bit 
more complex and potentially relevant to Colorado’s ongoing examina-
tion of whether medical marijuana is legal. The opinion states that medi-
cal marijuana remains illegal under federal law.
19
 It also notes that, ex-
cept where allowed under the MMA, it remains illegal under state law. 
This at least suggests the opinion holds that medical marijuana is legal, 
within prescribed limits, under state law. The opinion also asserts that 
“regardless of the legality,” parties must obtain a retail sales license and 
pay sales tax.
20
 The opinion concludes that even if medical marijuana is 
illegal, “state tax law should not allow an individual or business engaged 





 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. (citing COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-4 (2014)).  
 19. Id. at 4.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 5.  
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SECTION 3.2. In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 803 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) 
In Rent-Rite Super Kegs,22 a creditor argued that the debtor’s deci-
sion to lease to growers of marijuana violated federal statutes—known as 
the “crack house” statute—and that these violations could result in forfei-
ture of the property, putting the creditor’s property at risk.
23
 The bank-
ruptcy court noted that although this risk may be small due to the federal 
government’s suggestion that it would not typically seek indictments 
under the Controlled Substances Act, it could not force the creditor to 
“bear even a highly improbable risk of total loss of its collateral in sup-
port of the Debtor’s ongoing violation of federal criminal law.”
24
 The 
court concluded that although it assumed the medical marijuana opera-
tions were “lawful under Colorado state law,” it concluded that the case 
should either be converted to a Chapter 7 or dismissed, and set a hearing 
to reach a final conclusion.
25
  
SECTION 3.3. People v. Watkins, 282 P.3d 500 (Colo. App. 2012) 
In Watkins,26 the defendant, who agreed as a condition of his proba-
tion that he would not “commit another offense,” sought permission to 
use medical marijuana. The court of appeals considered whether a condi-
tion of probation requiring a probationer not to “commit another offense” 
included an offense under federal law.
27
  
The court concluded that the term offense, in the probation context, 
was expansive.
28
 It noted that the term could even include the violation 
of local ordinances, if confinement was a potential penalty.
29
 What is 
most interesting about the decision is its dicta. The court overtly stated 
that the use of medical marijuana is lawful, and it even suggested it 
might be a constitutional right.
30
 It concluded that this would not change 
the outcome of this case—holding that “even if we were to agree with 
defendant that the [MMA] gives him a general constitutional right to use 
marijuana for medical purposes,” this would not be decisive because 
“probation is a privilege, not a right.”
31
 However, such a holding could 
have broad reaching implications in other cases.  
  
 22. In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd.,484 B.R. 799, 802 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012). 
 23. Id. at 806 (citing Maintaining Drug-Involved Premises, 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2003)).  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. n.1; accord id. at 811.  
 26. People v. Watkins, 282 P.3d 500, 501 (Colo. App. 2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 503. 
 29. Id. (citing People v. Slayton, 878 P.2d 106, 107 (Colo. App. 1994)).  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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SECTION 3.4. Beinor v. Industrial Claims Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 
(Colo. App. 2011) 
In Beinor,32 the court of appeals considered a question of first im-
pression:  
[W]hether an employee terminated for testing positive for marijuana 
in violation of an employer's zero-tolerance drug policy may be de-
nied unemployment compensation benefits even if the worker's use 
of marijuana is “medical use” as defined in article XVIII, section 14 
of the Colorado Constitution.
33
  
The court concluded that the benefits could be denied.
34
 In reaching 
its conclusion, the court engaged in an analysis of whether the MMA 
made the use of medical marijuana lawful and whether the use of medi-
cal marijuana is subject to a “prescription”—an important question be-
cause unemployment law allows for termination of benefits for the use of 
controlled substances that are not medically prescribed.
35
 The court first 
noted that under the MMA, a physician does not prescribe medical mari-
juana.
36
 Instead, she can only provide “written documentation” stating 
that it might help.
37
 It also noted that under the Controlled Substances 
Act, such a prescription is impossible because marijuana is a Schedule I 




After dispensing with these fairly obvious conclusions, the court of 
appeals then interpreted the MMA. Its most important conclusion was 
that the amendment does not create an “unfettered right to medical use of 
marijuana.”
39
 Interestingly, in support of this, it stated the MMA express-
ly prohibits use of medical marijuana in a way that endangers the health 
or well-being of any person and prohibits the use of medical marijuana in 
places open to the general public.
40
  
Perhaps recognizing that the reasoning was not especially persua-
sive—after all, speech can be zoned, guns are banned from some places, 
and prayer can’t occur at all times in all places—the court of appeals 
bolstered its position by referring to the legislation that was enacted by 
the Colorado General Assembly to implement the MMA.
41
 The court 
stated that the General Assembly’s reading of the amendment should be 
  
 32. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 971 (Colo. App. 2011). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 972–73.  
 36. Id. at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 974 (citing Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (2012)).  
 39. Id. at 975. 
 40. Id. (citing COLO. CONST. art XVIII, § 14(5)(a)(I)).  
 41. Id.  
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given deference.
42
 And it stated that the General Assembly viewed the 
amendment as one that “creates limited exceptions to the criminal laws 
of this state for patients, primary care givers, and physicians concerning 
the medical use of marijuana.”
43
  
Finally, the court cited the MMA for the proposition that “[n]othing 
in this section shall require any employer to accommodate the medical 
use of marijuana in any work place.”
44
 The court apparently read this 
language to unambiguously allow employers to choose not to accommo-
date an employee’s use of medical marijuana, even outside the work-
place.
45
 The court of appeals concluded that denial of unemployment 
benefits was appropriate but noted that it was not deciding whether an 
employee could be fired for using medical marijuana.
46
  
The Beinor opinion contains a vigorous dissent by Judge Gabriel. 
The dissent asserted that it was far from clear that the MMA created only 
an affirmative defense to prosecution.
47
 Instead, the dissent stated that 
the MMA is ambiguous and requires reference to outside aids to deter-
mine the voter's intent.
48
  
Turning first to the Ballot Title, the dissent noted that although the 
language of the title might not be crystal clear, it certainly suggested that 
the amendment authorized the use of medical marijuana.
49
 Next, the dis-
sent noted that the Blue Book stated the amendment allows patients to 
“legally possess” marijuana for medical purposes and doctors to “legally 
provide” the same.
50
 Similarly, in the Blue Book section entitled “Argu-
ments For,” the proponents of the MMA stated that “[u]sing marijuana 
for other than medical purposes will still be illegal in Colorado. Legal 
use of marijuana will be limited to patients on the state registry.”
51
 
The dissent concluded that these provisions made clear that the 
MMA is intended to make medical marijuana legal and to create a consti-
tutional right to possess medical marijuana pursuant to the limitations 
contained in the MMA.
52
 Based on the plain language of the MMA, ac-
  
 42. Id. at 976 (citing Zaner v. City of Brighton, 899 P.2d 263, 267 (Colo. App. 1994), aff’d, 
917 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1996)).  
 43. Id. at 975–76 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §18-18-406.3(1)(b) (2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 44. Id. at 976 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, 14(10)(b) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 978 (Gabriel, J., dissenting).  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 979. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 980 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52. Id. at 981.  
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tual use of medical marijuana in the workplace is prohibited but not ma-
rijuana in a person's bloodstream while at work.
53
 
SECTION 3.5. Coats. v. DISH Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 149 (Co-
lo. App. 2013), cert. granted, 2014 WL 279960 (Colo. Jan. 27, 2014) 
Plaintiff Brandon Coats is a quadriplegic who uses medical mariju-
ana to control painful muscle spasms.
54
 Coats worked at DISH as a cus-
tomer service representative until he was fired by DISH after he tested 
positive for THC.
55
 There was no evidence of impairment, and there 
were no problems with his job performance.
56
  
Coats argued that his termination violated the Lawful Activities 
Statute, section 24–34–402.5, an employment discrimination provision of 
the Colorado Civil Rights Act.
57
 The statute prohibits an employer from 
firing an employee for “engaging in any lawful activity off the premises 
of the employer during nonworking hours.”
58
 DISH argued that Coats’ 




The court of appeals engaged in a surprisingly simple analysis. It 
asserted that lawful is defined in the dictionary to mean “authorized by 
law and not contrary to, nor forbidden by law.”
60
 The court stated that 
since the use of medical marijuana is not lawful under federal law, at 
least some law forbids it.
61
 As a result, the court reasoned that Mr. Coats’ 
behavior was not lawful.
62
 Because the court took this approach, it never 
addressed whether the MMA makes such use lawful under state law.  
Like Beinor, the majority opinion drew a lengthy, carefully rea-
soned dissent. Judge Webb argued that the term lawful is ambiguous.
63
 
He took issue with using a dictionary to define the term, instead suggest-
ing that it should be read in context.
64
 He searched for “the spirit of a 
statute and not simply the letter of the law.”
65
 He also noted that case law 
requires that the statute be read broadly, but the majority’s reading im-
properly narrowed it.
66
 Based on a variety of factors, the dissent conclud-
  
 53. Id.  
 54. Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 149 (Colo. App. 2013), cert. granted, 2014 
WL 279960 (Colo. Jan. 27, 2014). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 150 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 797 (5th ed. 1979)).  
 61. Id. at 151. 
 62. Id. at 149. 
 63. Id. at 155 (Webb, J., dissenting).  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66. Id. (citing Watson v. Public Service Co., 207 P.3d 860, 864 (Colo. App. 2008)). 
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Based on this conclusion, Judge Webb turned to whether the LAS 
makes medical marijuana lawful.
68
 He began by referencing Judge Ga-
briel’s dissent in Beinor—in which Judge Gabriel concluded there is a 
constitutional right to use medical marijuana within prescribed limits.
69
 
Judge Webb then noted a number of reasons why, at a minimum, the use 
of medical marijuana was lawful. These included the fact that the MMA 
specifically uses the term lawful, the Blue Book refers to being able to 
legally possess medical marijuana, and the statement in Watkins that the 
use of medical marijuana is lawful.
70
 
Section 3.6. Emerging Trends  
After reading the case summaries, it is clear that the law remains in 
flux. However, a few patterns emerge. Although courts continue to wres-
tle with the state and federal interplay, most courts reach the conclusion 
that the MMA makes medical marijuana use lawful under state law. Sev-
eral other courts or judges have implied, or explicitly held that the MMA 
may go further, creating at least a limited right to use medical marijuana. 
Coats, then, is critical because it will either confirm that medical mariju-
ana use is lawful or depart from this trend, and it will then start to shape 
the contours of how much protection state law will offer those who use 
medical marijuana.  
SECTION 4. COATS V. DISH—COLORADO SUPREME COURT 
The briefs are not yet filed in Coats v. DISH, but a few things seem 
clear. The Colorado Supreme Court has the opportunity to answer two 
important questions. First, are Colorado employees who use medical 
marijuana protected by Colorado law or can they be fired? Second, does 
the MMA, at least under Colorado law, make medical marijuana lawful 
and does it therefore confer a right to use it within prescribed limits?  
DISH is certain to argue the answer is no to both questions, and Mr. 
Coats is certain to argue the contrary. I leave that fight to the briefs and 
the resolution of the dispute to the Court’s wisdom. However, this article 
is an opportunity to explore some of the policy implications of the deci-
sion.  
Employers are rightly concerned that if they are required to employ 
people who use medical marijuana, they may lose business because of 
the federal law. But there seem to be simple solutions to this potential 
conflict. The LAS allows for termination of an employee, even if he is 
  
 67. Id. at 157. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
90 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 91 
engaging in lawful activity, if (a) his activity would interfere with bona 
fide occupational qualifications or (b) it would create a conflict of inter-
est for the employer.
71
 These outs seem sufficient to ensure that no em-
ployer has to lose business in order to comply with state law, and no em-
ployer has to risk public safety either.  
Similarly, given that the federal government has largely declined to 
enforce drug laws in Colorado, so long as Colorado maintains a strong 
regulatory scheme, it seems unlikely that DISH or other employers will 
face federal pressure to terminate people like Mr. Coats. In addition, a 
review of the existing laws applying to federal contractors suggests that 
DISH does not have to test its employees and, even if it did, it does not 
have to fire an employee who tests positive for THC.
72
 As a result, the 
overall risks of reading the LAS to protect employees who use medical 
marijuana outside of work and who perform their jobs satisfactorily seem 
minimal.  
Similarly, the downside to reading the MMA as making medical 
marijuana lawful is similarly small. Although one might argue that it will 
limit the state’s ability to control the use of medical marijuana, this 
doesn’t seem true. Even the most sacred federal constitutional rights are 
subject to regulation. Speech is zoned in time and place, guns are prohib-
ited in some areas and regulated carefully, assembly sometimes requires 
preapproval, and due process is limited and expanded based on the situa-
tion. The same types of limits on medical marijuana will remain permis-
sible even if it is lawful.  
Conversely, the upside to a determination that the MMA makes 
medical marijuana lawful is significant. First and foremost, it would like-
ly mean that the LAS protects people like Mr. Coats. This is a good 
thing, as he and others often depend on medical marijuana to work. Pro-
moting the dignity of work is good for people and for the economy, both 
because it produces consumers and because it avoids relegating people 
like Mr. Coats to relying on welfare.  
Reading the MMA and the LAS to protect Mr. Coats also avoids a 
potential risk that is looming. It is likely that until now many employers 
have not fired employees who test positive for THC for fear of a legal 
fight. But if the Colorado Supreme Court were to hold that such termina-
tions are legal, a rash of such firings could follow. Moving people out of 
work and onto government assistance is not sound economic or social 
policy.  
Beyond the work setting, interpreting the MMA to make medical 
marijuana lawful would promote certainty and ensure that people who 
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invest in the trade can do so confidently. Knowing that contracts matter, 
that insurance can be obtained, and that, in general, property rights are 
intact is critical to a functioning economy. The state has a significant 
financial interest in seeing that this hold true, as medical marijuana gen-
erates roughly $2 million per quarter in tax revenue.
73
 Finally, the cer-
tainty gained from an unequivocal ruling should reduce litigation and the 
transactional costs built into contracts dealing with medical marijuana.  
SECTION 5. CONCLUSION 
Colorado law regarding medical marijuana has evolved slowly, and 
to date it has been less than clear. But the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
upcoming decision in Coats could be the turning point—a chance to clar-
ify the law, make sound policy choices, respect the will of the people, 
and create a more certain future.  
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